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ABSTRACT 
The collateral order doctrine is perhaps the most significant excep-
tion to the general rule that only final judgments are appealable. The doc-
trine is particularly important in antitrust litigation when a defendant as-
serts state action immunity, often referred to as Parker immunity. How-
ever, the circuit courts have struggled with the question of whether a de-
nial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable as a collateral order. 
This unsettled procedural issue is further complicated by the fact that the 
substantive law on Parker immunity differs depending on the entity as-
serting state action. 
This Article argues that a governmental entity that is deemed part 
of a state should be able to use the interlocutory appeal process to obtain 
review of an order denying Parker immunity. On the other hand, gov-
ernment defendants deemed not part of the state, as well as private enti-
ties, should not be able to immediately appeal an adverse state action 
determination under the collateral order doctrine. In addition, this Article 
explores the collateral order doctrine’s applicability in FTC adjudicatory 
proceedings. Cases such as North Carolina State Board of Dental Exam-
iners v. FTC and FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. demonstrate 
the Supreme Court’s renewed interest in the scope of state action immun-
ity. However, the question of whether a denial of Parker immunity is 
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine is also an im-
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INTRODUCTION 
The state action doctrine1 immunizes certain conduct that is the in-
tentional or foreseeable result of state or local government policy from 
the federal antitrust laws.2 Although it may seem obscure,3 the state ac-
                                                            
 1. It merits brief comment that this Article only discusses the antitrust state action doctrine. 
The concept of state action in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is different from 
and much broader than the antitrust state action doctrine. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 221a, at 47 (4th ed. 2013) (emphasizing that “conclusions of ‘state 
action’ in the Fourteenth Amendment context should never be used to support a finding of ‘state 
action’ in the antitrust context”); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Federalism and Antitrust Reform, 40 
U.S.F. L. REV. 627, 628 n.15 (2006) (asserting that the antitrust state action doctrine and Fourteenth 
Amendment state action doctrine “are rarely confused”). 
 2. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 1271 (7th ed. 2012) 
[hereinafter ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS]. 
 3. Indeed, at one point in time the state action doctrine was a minor part of U.S. antitrust law. 
See Richard Quaresima, Comment, Antitrust Law—State Action Doctrine—State Agencies Exempt 
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tion doctrine is a critical part of antitrust law.4 The doctrine is important 
because it implicates two key constitutional principles—federalism and 
state sovereignty.5 In addition, the doctrine has a significant impact when 
state or local governments adopt economic or social policies that conflict 
with open competition.6 
After remaining largely dormant, the state action doctrine has seen 
a resurgence in recent years.7 For example, in 2013, the United States 
Supreme Court ruled on the applicability of the state action doctrine to a 
hospital merger in FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.8 It was the 
first time in twenty years that the Supreme Court heard a case on the 
state action doctrine.9 In 2015, the Supreme Court decided North Caroli-
na State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,10 another prominent case 
involving the state action doctrine.11 Despite an extended period during 
                                                                                                                                     
from the Active Supervision Prong of the Midcal Test. Hass v. Oregon State Bar, 883 F.2d 1453 (9th 
Cir.1989), Cert. Denied, 110 S. Ct. 1812 (1990), 22 RUTGERS L.J. 525, 529 (1991) (highlighting that 
the “state action doctrine languished in relative obscurity for the first thirty years of its existence”). 
In fact, only one Supreme Court case in over three decades directly discussed the state action doc-
trine since it was first articulated in 1943. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 
U.S. 384, 389, reh’g denied, 341 U.S. 956 (1951) (addressing state action issues in dicta). 
 4. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under 
the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 272 (2003) (stating 
that many “scholars have labored over the nuances of state action immunity”). 
 5. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991) (asserting the 
state action doctrine relies on “principles of federalism and state sovereignty”). 
 6. See, e.g., New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 111 (1978) 
(enforcement of state statute allowing existing auto dealers to obstruct new dealerships within their 
markets protected under state action doctrine); Kay Elec. Coop. v. City of Newkirk, 647 F.3d 1039, 
1041 (10th Cir. 2011) (municipality’s tying of electric and sewer services not protected under the 
state action doctrine). 
 7. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL 5 (2d ed. 2010) 
[hereinafter STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL] (noting that the doctrine is “a significant compo-
nent of recent jurisprudence regarding the appropriate balance of power between both state and 
national governments and the judicial and legislative branches”); The Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act and the Consequent Impact on Competition in Healthcare: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Professor Thomas L. Greaney), avail-
able at http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/113th/09192013_2/Greaney%20Testimony.pdf 
(proclaiming that the doctrine is currently “[a]mong the important issues on the antitrust agenda”). 
 8. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1007 (2013). 
 9. The last time the Court decided a state action case was in 1992. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. 
Co., 504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992). 
 10. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 11. See Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, Court Demands State Oversight Over Agencies for 
Antitrust Immunity, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 2015, at 1, available at https://www.skadden.com/sites/ 
default/files/publications/070031520Skadden.pdf (stating, “As a result of the court’s opinion [in 
North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners], many industries . . . may have to rethink their 
professional regulatory regimes currently in place nationwide.”); Jacob Gershman, Cases on Securi-
ties Fraud, Teeth-Whitening, Prisoner Beards Enter Supreme Court’s Docket, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG 
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which few state action cases were heard by the Supreme Court, the occa-
sions for considering the state action doctrine in antitrust litigation “are 
numerous and diverse.”12 Accordingly, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) has recently increased enforcement actions involving the state ac-
tion doctrine.13 Although many Supreme Court decisions have defined 
the meaning and limits of the state action doctrine,14 these decisions have 
left “a great deal of confusion about the source and the scope” of the doc-
trine.15 
One area of confusion regarding the scope of the state action doc-
trine is whether an order denying a motion to dismiss an antitrust claim 
under the doctrine is immediately appealable as a collateral order.16 Fed-
eral courts of appeals have grappled with this issue in a variety of ways, 
and a circuit split has emerged. The Fourth17 and Sixth18 Circuits held 
that a ruling denying a motion to dismiss an antitrust claim under the 
state action doctrine is not immediately appealable as a collateral order. 
On the other hand, the Fifth19 and Eleventh20 Circuits held that such a 
ruling is immediately appealable as a collateral order. However, the Fifth 
Circuit held that only governmental defendants asserting the state action 
                                                                                                                                     
(Mar. 3, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/03/03/cases-on-securities-fraud-teeth-
whitening-prisoner-beards-enter-supreme-courts-docket/. 
 12. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 221a, at 47. 
 13. See J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Returning the State Action 
Doctrine to Its Moorings (Oct. 3, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_statements/returning-state-action-doctrine-its-moorings/121003stateaction.pdf 
(revealing that “the FTC has sought to clarify the state action doctrine by bringing administrative 
and federal court cases [and] filing amicus briefs”). 
 14. See STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 9–14, 15 (examining the “flurry of 
Supreme Court cases in the mid- to late 1970s” on the state action doctrine and observing that the 
“abundance of state action cases in the 1970s demonstrated the importance of the doctrine”); Steven 
Semeraro, Demystifying Antitrust State Action Doctrine, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 203, 210 
(2000) (noting that “the Court decided more than a dozen antitrust state action cases” from the mid-
1970s through the early 1990s). 
 15. David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, 
Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 293, 293 (1994); see STATE 
ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 109 (stating that the “doctrine has presented a number 
of recurring policy issues since its creation”); see also FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT 
OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 57 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/state 
actionreport.pdf (recognizing that “Supreme Court case law has left open many important questions 
regarding the scope of the state action doctrine”). 
 16. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 228e, at 245–46; STATE ACTION PRACTICE 
MANUAL, supra note 7, at 156–60. 
 17. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 442 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 18. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 19. Martin v. Mem’l Hosp., 86 F.3d 1391, 1397 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 20. Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cnty. Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286, 1290 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
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doctrine can take advantage of an immediate appeal and that private de-
fendants cannot immediately appeal an order denying a motion to dis-
miss under the state action doctrine.21 Likewise, the Tenth Circuit, in the 
most recent decision on the issue of interlocutory appeals of state action 
rulings, held that a private defendant is not entitled to an immediate ap-
peal of a trial court order on the state action doctrine.22 The Third23 and 
Seventh24 Circuits have also contributed to this circuit split, albeit in dic-
ta, suggesting that the denial of a governmental defendant’s state action 
immunity is subject to immediate appeal. The fact that seven of the thir-
teen federal courts of appeals have addressed the immediate appealability 
of an order denying a motion to dismiss under the state action doctrine 
demonstrates the significance and complexity of this procedural issue in 
antitrust litigation.25 
This Article attempts to resolve the question of immediate 
appealability by applying the Supreme Court’s test for the availability of 
interlocutory appeals to orders denying a motion to dismiss under the 
state action doctrine. This Article asserts that a governmental entity that 
is deemed part of a state should be able to use the interlocutory appeal 
process to obtain review of an order denying a motion to dismiss under 
the state action doctrine. However, governmental defendants deemed not 
part of the state itself and private entities should not be able to immedi-
ately appeal an adverse state action determination under the collateral 
order doctrine. 
Part I of this Article provides a historical overview of the state ac-
tion doctrine and presents background information on how the doctrine is 
                                                            
 21. Acoustic Sys., Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 207 F.3d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 2000). In contrast, the 
Eleventh Circuit has held that private defendants may immediately appeal an order denying a motion 
to dismiss under the state action doctrine. See Praxair, Inc. v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 64 F.3d 609, 
611 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 22. Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 F.3d 
1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 2013). The Tenth Circuit felt it “unnecessary to weigh in on the circuit split” 
on whether governmental defendants could immediately appeal an order denying a motion to dismiss 
under the state action doctrine and only ruled on whether private defendants could immediately 
appeal. Id. at 1151. 
 23. We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 329 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding denial of 
Noerr–Pennington immunity not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine). 
 24. Segni v. Commercial Office of Spain, 816 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir. 1987) (ruling private 
defendant was not entitled to an immediate appeal from a denial of a defense based on the First 
Amendment’s Petition Clause, but that an order denying foreign government immunity under For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act was immediately appealable as a collateral order). 
 25. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the importance of procedural issues in antitrust 
actions. See Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 903–04 (2015) (considering whether 
bondholder plaintiffs accusing several banks of violating antitrust law by rigging the London Inter-
Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) had the right to immediately appeal the dismissal of their case even 
though broader multidistrict litigation was still ongoing). 
6 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:1 
applied to different entities. Part II outlines the requirements for appel-
late jurisdiction, discussing both the final judgment rule and the collat-
eral order doctrine. Part III explains the Article’s finding that those gov-
ernmental defendants that are deemed part of the state are entitled to an 
immediate appeal. Next, Part IV examines the immediate appealability of 
rulings on the state action doctrine when the defendant is a governmental 
entity not part of the state itself or a private party, and analyzes why the-
se defendants should not be entitled to an immediate appeal. Finally, Part 
V explores the immediate appealability of state action orders in the con-
text of FTC adjudicative proceedings. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
The federal antitrust laws have been described as the “Magna Carta 
of free enterprise.”26 As a result, the Supreme Court has asserted that the-
se laws “are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and 
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our 
fundamental personal freedoms.”27 Although the federal antitrust laws 
are integral to competition and free enterprise, Congress has adopted 
many exemptions. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act affords in-
surers an exemption from the federal antitrust laws,28 the Norris-
LaGuardia Act immunizes certain activities involving organized labor 
from the federal antitrust laws,29 and the Shipping Act of 1984 exempts 
from antitrust liability any agreement between ocean common carriers 
that is filed with the Federal Maritime Commission.30 In the absence of a 
specific statutory exemption, federal courts have developed exemptions 
and immunities to federal antitrust laws as well. One such “judicially 
created exemption” is the state action doctrine.31 
The state action doctrine was first recognized in 1943 when the Su-
preme Court decided Parker v. Brown.32 As a result, the state action doc-
                                                            
 26. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). 
 27. Id. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-40). 
 29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–110, 113–115 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-40). 
 30. 46 U.S.C. § 40307(a)(1)–(2) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-25). 
 31. Darren Bush, Mission Creep: Antitrust Exemptions and Immunities as Applied to Deregu-
lated Industries, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 761, 770 (2006); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State 
Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227, 256 (1987). 
 32. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). However, it is important to note that the state action 
doctrine’s genesis can be traced to several prior decisions, some of which the Court cited to in Par-
ker. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 344–47 (1904) (rejecting claim that mere 
state authorization immunized a merger); Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1904) (finding the 
Sherman Act inapplicable to a claim that a state governor was restraining trade by refusing to grant a 
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trine is also known as Parker immunity.33 In Parker, a California state 
statute, the Agricultural Prorate Act, authorized state officials to establish 
marketing programs for agricultural commodities produced in the state.34 
The express purpose of the program was to restrict competition among 
growers of those commodities.35 In that case, the plaintiff, Porter I. 
Brown, produced, purchased, and packed raisins.36 Brown challenged the 
validity of California’s Agricultural Prorate Act as a violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act,37 and sued the California Director of Agriculture, 
W.B. Parker, who helped administer the marketing program.38 A 
three-judge district court panel permanently enjoined California’s pro-
gram.39 However, the Supreme Court reversed the injunction.40 
The Court in Parker upheld the California program regulating the 
marketing of raisins as an “act of government which the Sherman Act did 
not undertake to prohibit.”41 In its unanimous decision, the Court primar-
ily relied on legislative intent to conclude that California’s raisin market-
ing program was valid under the Sherman Act.42 Based on the Sherman 
Act’s legislative history, the Court determined that Congress did not in-
tend to restrain state action.43 The Court noted that “an unexpressed pur-
pose to nullify a state’s control over its officers and agents is not lightly 
to be attributed to Congress.”44 Accordingly, the Court interpreted the 
Sherman Act as “a prohibition of individual and not state action.”45 
                                                                                                                                     
pilot’s license); Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895) (upholding South Carolina 
statute creating a state liquor monopoly). 
 33. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 1271; see also City of Lafayette v. La. 
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 415 (1978) (referring to the state action doctrine as “Parker im-
munity”). This Article will use the terms “state action doctrine” and “Parker immunity” inter-
changeably. As discussed in more detail later in this Article, the state action doctrine, as applied to 
governmental entities deemed part of the state, is in fact an immunity and the term “Parker immuni-
ty” is not a misnomer. See infra Part III.A. 
 34. Parker, 317 U.S. at 346. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 344. 
 37. Id. at 348–49. 
 38. Id. at 344. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 368. 
 41. Id. at 352 (citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1904) and comparing Lowenstein 
v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 910 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895)). 
 42. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 43 (stating that “the Parker Court 
largely focused on legislative intent”). 
 43. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350–51 (finding “nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its 
history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities 
directed by its legislature”). 
 44. Id. at 351. 
 45. Id. at 352. 
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The Parker decision left open the issue of whether the conduct of 
private actors and subordinate government entities could be exempt from 
federal antitrust laws based on the state action doctrine.46 However, in a 
series of cases in the 1980s, the Supreme Court found that private actors 
and certain subordinate government entities could rely on the state action 
doctrine to shield their conduct from federal antitrust scrutiny. In Cali-
fornia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, the Court estab-
lished a two-part test for determining whether private actors could take 
advantage of Parker immunity.47 The unanimous Court stated that (1) the 
challenged restraint must be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively 
expressed as state policy[,]” and (2) “the policy must be ‘actively super-
vised’ by the State itself.”48 Because actions of a state legislature and a 
state’s highest court acting in a legislative capacity are treated as the ac-
tion of a state itself, the state action doctrine applies to these entities 
without a need to establish the clear articulation and active supervision 
requirements of Midcal.49 
Midcal’s two-part test has long supplied the framework within 
which courts have determined the availability of the state action defense 
to private parties.50 However, actions taken by subordinate government 
entities such as counties and municipalities may also be entitled to Par-
ker immunity. Subordinate government entities are not entitled to the 
                                                            
 46. See id. (clarifying that “no question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant 
in a private agreement or combination by others for restraint of trade” was presented). 
 47. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
 48. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 49. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568–69 (1984) (“Where the conduct at issue is in fact 
that of the state legislature or supreme court, we need not address the issues of ‘clear articulation’ 
and ‘active supervision.’”). There is a paucity of case law on whether actions of the governor are 
treated as actions of the state itself and thus need not meet Midcal’s two prongs. See id. at 568 n.17 
(noting that its ruling did not address “whether the Governor of a State stands in the same position as 
the state legislature and supreme court for purposes of the state-action doctrine”). However, many 
antitrust scholars believe that courts should treat the actions of a governor as actions of the state 
itself. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 224b, at 405 (2d ed. 2000); JOHN E. LOPATKA & 
WILLIAM H. PAGE, NARROWING THE SCOPE OF THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE: REPORT PREPARED 
FOR THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 32–33 (2001); C. Douglas Floyd, Plain Ambiguities in the 
Clear Articulation Requirement for State Action Antitrust Immunity: The Case of State Agencies, 41 
B.C. L. REV. 1059, 1081–83 (2000) (arguing that all public authorities that have the power to formu-
late a general policy in favor of the anticompetitive arrangements for the state as a whole need not 
meet both Midcal prongs). 
 50. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Antitrust State-Action Doctrine After Fisher v. Berkeley, 39 
VAND. L. REV. 1257, 1266–67 (1986) (stating that “[a]lthough the clear articulation and supervision 
standards were drawn from the Court’s prior state-action decisions, only in Midcal did they attain the 
status of sine qua nons for application of the state-action defense” and that “Midcal has remained a 
significant precedent because its standards have continued, at least formally, to govern the applica-
tion of the state-action doctrine”). 
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same protection from the federal antitrust laws as a state itself, and thus 
also fall under the Midcal framework.51 However, municipalities and 
local government entities need only satisfy Midcal’s first prong for their 
conduct to be exempt from federal antitrust laws under the state action 
doctrine.52 
The state action doctrine is a strong weapon, or perhaps more ap-
propriately, a shield, in the arsenal of antitrust defendants.53 Because the 
state action doctrine “derive[s] from principles of federalism and other 
constitutional considerations,”54 and is a long-term priority of the Federal 
Trade Commission,55 it is an important exemption that governmental and 
private entities will continue to invoke in antitrust litigation. 
II. THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE AND COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE 
Generally, federal courts of appeals only have jurisdiction to review 
“final decisions” of the federal district courts.56 This is known as the “fi-
nal judgment rule.”57 The final judgment rule is codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291 and provides that “the courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction 
of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United 
States.”58 Thus, the requirement that there be a “final decision” serves as 
                                                            
 51. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978) (finding that 
“[c]ities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of the States that 
create them”); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 55 (1982) (narrowly constru-
ing the meaning of Midcal’s first prong as applied to a municipality acting under a home rule stat-
ute). 
 52. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985) (“Once it is clear that state 
authorization exists, there is no need to require the State to supervise actively the municipality’s 
execution of what is a properly delegated function.”). It is unclear whether state executive depart-
ments and agencies are part of the state itself or are considered subordinate government entities that 
must satisfy Midcal’s first prong. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 1279. 
 53. See Elizabeth Trujillo, State Action Antitrust Exemption Collides with Deregulation: Reha-
bilitating the Foreseeability Doctrine, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 349, 352 (2006) (describing 
the state action doctrine as a “particularly useful tool for potential antitrust defendants”). 
 54. ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 1271. 
 55. Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery at the 
Sixth Annual Georgetown Law Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 19, 2012), availa-
ble at 2012 WL 4339298 (asserting that the state action doctrine is an “example of the [Federal 
Trade] Commission’s long-term priorities”). 
 56. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-40). 
 57. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 
600 (3d ed. 1999) (stating “the question of when an appeal can be taken is governed by the so-called 
‘final judgment rule’”). See generally Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 
41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932) (tracing the roots of the final judgment rule to English writ of error practice 
where the King’s Bench corrected errors of the other common law courts). 
 58. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (West, Westlaw current through P.L. 114-40). 
10 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 39:1 
a precondition to review by the federal appellate courts.59 The Supreme 
Court has described a “final decision” as one that “ends the litigation on 
the merits.”60 The most salient rationale underlying the final judgment 
rule is a desire to achieve judicial economy and efficiency.61 The rule 
protects the appellate courts from the “intolerable burden” of reviewing 
countless pretrial orders and prevents parties from driving up costs by 
appealing every order in an effort to avoid a decision on the merits.62 
Nonetheless, there is an eclectic array of statutory63 and common 
law64 exceptions to the final judgment rule. Perhaps the most important 
exception to the final judgment rule is the collateral order doctrine,65 
which was introduced by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial In-
                                                            
 59. Id. The Supreme Court encountered the concept of finality of judgments as early as 1848. 
See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848). 
 60. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
 61. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) (stating that the final 
judgment rule “serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial administration”); Note, 
Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351, 351 (1961) (asserting “[t]he basic ra-
tionale of the finality rule is conservation of judicial resources” and constant interruption by inter-
locutory appeals “would consume trial court time, forestall the ultimate resolution of the case, and 
facilitate the harassment of one party by his opponent”); infra Part III.D for an explanation of how 
judicial economy is not undermined by allowing immediate appeals by governmental defendants 
deemed part of the state. See generally Gary L. Davis & Joseph E. Reber, Cost of Appeal, 27 MONT. 
L. REV. 49 (1965) (detailing costliness of appeals). 
 62. Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 542 (1998). 
 63. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-49 (excluding P.L. 114-
41)) (allowing appeal of interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolv-
ing injunctions”); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2) (permitting appeal of interlocutory orders involving the 
appointment of receiverships); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (authorizing appeal of interlocutory orders 
that determine “the rights and liabilities of the parties” in admiralty cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 
(providing that, despite the absence of a final judgment, a party may obtain interlocutory review of 
“an order not otherwise appealable” with the consent of both the trial court and the court of appeals). 
 64. One judicially developed exception to the final judgment rule involves cases in which some 
immediate harm might occur to the appellant if review is postponed. See Forgay, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 
at 206 (allowing appeal on the ground that there would have been irreparable harm to the losing 
party if review was delayed and the appellant was forced to comply with the trial judge’s decree). 
 65. See FRIEDENTHAL, KANE & MILLER, supra note 57, at 608 (stating that the collateral order 
doctrine is the “most widely used” judicial exception to the final judgment rule); Aaron R. Petty, The 
Hidden Harmony of Appellate Jurisdiction, 62 S.C. L. REV. 353, 387 (2010) (characterizing the 
collateral order doctrine as “the most significant exception to the final judgment rule”); Michael E. 
Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action Certification and Interlocuto-
ry Review by the United States Courts of Appeals under Rule 23(F), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 
1548 (2000) (describing the collateral order doctrine as a “major qualification to the final judgment 
rule”). However, the Supreme Court has avoided labeling the collateral order doctrine an “excep-
tion” to the final judgment rule. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (noting the collateral 
order doctrine is “best understood not as an exception to the ‘final decision’ rule laid down by Con-
gress in [28 U.S.C.] § 1291, but as a ‘practical construction’ of it”); see also GREGORY A. 
CASTANIAS & ROBERT H. KLONOFF, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 82 (2008) 
(explaining that an order under the collateral order doctrine “is a species of a final judgment”). 
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dustrial Loan Corp. in 1949.66 In Cohen, a shareholder brought a deriva-
tive action in federal court against a corporation’s officers and directors 
under the court’s diversity jurisdiction.67 The company moved for an or-
der requiring the shareholder to post security for costs, as required under 
a state statute.68 The district court denied the motion and the corporation 
appealed to the Third Circuit, which ultimately concluded that the order 
was appealable.69 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.70 In making its rul-
ing, the Court held that the final judgment rule, as articulated in 28 
U.S.C. § 1291, did not prevent immediate review of rulings that “finally 
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights assert-
ed in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent 
of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until 
the whole case is adjudicated.”71 The Supreme Court later established a 
three-pronged test for determining whether an order falls within this def-
inition.72 
Under the collateral order doctrine’s three-pronged test, an order 
must “[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an 
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] 
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”73 Each 
condition—conclusiveness, separability, and unreviewability—must be 
satisfied for the ruling to fall within the collateral order doctrine.74 The 
Court has explicated that these three conditions are “stringent” because 
otherwise, “the [collateral order] doctrine will overpower the substantial 
finality interests [that 28 U.S.C.] § 1291 is meant to further.”75 In addi-
tion, the Court has emphasized that the class of orders satisfying this 
“stringent” test should be understood as “small,” “modest,” and “nar-
row.”76 
The Court has found that orders denying absolute immunity,77 qual-
ified immunity,78 state sovereign immunity,79 and federal employees’ 
                                                            
 66. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545–47 (1949). 
 67. Id. at 543. 
 68. Id. at 544–45. 
 69. Id. at 545. 
 70. Id. at 545–47. 
 71. Id. at 546. 
 72. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 276 (1988). 
 75. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349–50 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
 76. Id. at 350 (internal citations omitted). 
 77. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982). 
 78. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
 79. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–45 (1993). 
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claims of immunity under the Westfall Act80 are immediately appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine. The Court has also ruled that orders 
adverse to a criminal defendant on the defense of double jeopardy fall 
within the collateral order doctrine.81 Conversely, orders refusing to dis-
miss a case on forum non conveniens grounds,82 imposing discovery 
sanctions,83 disqualifying counsel,84 and declining to enforce a contractu-
al forum selection clause85 are not immediately appealable under the col-
lateral order doctrine. Although the collateral order doctrine has been 
criticized by jurists86 and commentators,87 it nonetheless remains the 
“most important judicially-crafted exception to the final judgment rule”88 
and is a fundamental part of appellate procedure. 
III. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES DEEMED PART OF THE STATE 
The division among federal appellate courts89 over the immediate 
appealability of orders denying a motion to dismiss an antitrust claim 
under the state action doctrine is particularly acute where governmental 
entities are antitrust defendants.90 However, orders denying Parker im-
munity to governmental entities that are deemed part of the state itself, 
such as certain state-level executive departments and administrative 
agencies,91 likely fall within the “small class”92 of immediately appeala-
                                                            
 80. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 237–40 (2007). 
 81. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977). 
 82. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 527–30 (1988). 
 83. Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 208 (1999). 
 84. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 424–25 (1985). 
 85. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989). 
 86. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 189 n.4 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (con-
tending that the Court “invented” the collateral order doctrine, for which “[t]he statutory text [of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291] provides no basis”). 
 87. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 62, at 540–41 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s collateral 
order doctrine jurisprudence as confusing and causing an “explosion of purely procedural litigation 
over what orders are appealable”); Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary 
Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 204–05 (2001) (claiming that the 
collateral order doctrine “has had a troubled history” and is “the most maligned of the exceptions” to 
the final judgment rule); Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 
1237, 1252–57 (2007) (discussing “three principal problems” with the collateral order doctrine). 
 88. Petty, supra note 65, at 377. 
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 15–25. 
 90. See Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 
F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the circuit split on the question of whether denial 
of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by private parties “is much less pronounced” than the 
circuit split on the question of whether denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by 
governmental defendants). 
 91. Just as it is unclear whether actions of the governor constitute actions of the state itself, see 
supra note 49, it is unclear which state executive agencies or state regulatory bodies are part of the 
state. Compare Ajax Aluminum, Inc. v. Goodwill Indus., 564 F.Supp. 628, 629 (W.D. Mich. 1983) 
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ble orders because they satisfy the Supreme Court’s three-pronged test 
for determining whether a ruling falls within the collateral order doctrine. 
Embedded within the larger issue of interlocutory appeals of a state ac-
tion ruling as a collateral order is the “unsettled issue” of whether the 
state action doctrine provides immunity from suit or merely a defense to 
liability.93 Resolving this unsettled issue is critical to determining wheth-
er a state action ruling against the government satisfies each of the three 
prongs of the collateral order doctrine.94 
The three prongs of the collateral order doctrine overlap,95 making 
the doctrine extremely difficult to apply.96 Despite the overlap between 
the three prongs, this Part analyzes each prong of the collateral order 
doctrine individually. Furthermore, although it is immersed in each 
prong,97 the question of whether the state action doctrine is an immunity 
from suit or merely a defense to liability is most important to the third 
prong, the condition of unreviewability upon appeal from final judgment. 
Accordingly, this Part considers the application of the three-pronged test 
for the collateral order doctrine in the reverse order—unreviewability, 
separability, and conclusiveness—from which the prongs were articulat-
ed by the Supreme Court. 
A. Unreviewability 
The unreviewability prong of the collateral order doctrine is the re-
quirement that an issue be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment.98 An order is effectively unreviewable when it protects 
                                                                                                                                     
(ruling that Michigan’s department of labor was part of the state), with Midwest Constr. Co. v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Labor, 684 F.Supp. 991, 997 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (determining Illinois’s department of labor 
was not part of the state). The Supreme Court has not provided much guidance for distinguishing 
between the state itself and subordinate agencies, but has cautioned that ‘‘[s]tate agencies are not 
simply by their governmental character sovereign actors for purposes of state-action immunity.” 
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015). For conflicting judicial 
approaches in determining whether an entity qualifies as an “arm of the state” for purposes of state 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see infra note 174. 
 92. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 93. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 156. 
 94. See id. (“If the [state action] doctrine properly immunizes a defendant from standing trial, it 
would follow that the denial of a defendant’s preliminary motion on state action grounds is immedi-
ately appealable.”). 
 95. See Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that the multi-
pronged test for collateral orders is “redundant” and that the “[conclusiveness] ‘prong’ is part of the 
[unreviewability prong]”). 
 96. See Palmer, 806 F.2d at 1318 (stating the Supreme Court’s brief discussion of collateral 
orders in Cohen “has spawned an immense jurisprudence of collateral orders”); Petty, supra note 65, 
at 396. 
 97. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 156. 
 98. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006). 
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an interest that would be “essentially destroyed if its vindication must be 
postponed until trial is completed.”99 One such interest is a “right not to 
be tried.”100 A denial of the right not to be tried is effectively unreviewa-
ble on appeal from a final judgment because to get to such a final judg-
ment, the defendant must endure the trial-related burdens that the right is 
supposed to prohibit. In other words, a defendant’s right to not stand trial 
cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred. Accordingly, 
the classic case of an issue essentially unreviewable on appeal from a 
final judgment is a denial of immunity.101 
The Supreme Court has consistently invoked the collateral order 
doctrine to permit the review of orders denying immunity to governmen-
tal defendants. For example, as stated previously, the Court has found 
denials of executive immunity,102 qualified immunity for government 
officials,103 state sovereign immunity,104 and federal employees’ claims 
of immunity under the Westfall Act105 to be immediately appealable un-
der the collateral order doctrine. Because the immunity theory has been 
so favorably received under the collateral order doctrine, one commenta-
tor noted that the Supreme Court has “narrowed the scope of the doctrine 
to the point where today it is largely limited to immunities from trial” 
and that “nearly all other [types of] orders . . . [are] excluded from the 
collateral order club.”106 In contrast to an order denying immunity from 
suit, the rejection of a defense to a claim is not effectively unreviewable 
on appeal from a final judgment because a finding of liability can be re-
versed on appeal.107 Determining whether the state action doctrine is an 
immunity from suit or merely a defense to liability is, therefore, critical 
to establishing whether the unreviewability prong of the collateral order 
doctrine is satisfied. 
                                                            
 99. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 499 (1989). 
 100. Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 800 (1989). 
 101. DANA LIVINGSTON COBB, INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS AND MANDAMUS IN FEDERAL 
COURT 4 (2004), available at http://www.adjtlaw.com/assets/Federal%20Interloc%20Appeal%20 
and%20Mandamus%20UT%20App%202004.pdf. 
 102. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982). 
 103. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). 
 104. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–45 (1993). 
 105. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 237–40 (2007). 
 106. Petty, supra note 65, at 362, 384. 
 107. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526 (accentuating that the right not to stand trial is an immunity 
from suit, not a “mere defense to liability” and that such an entitlement is “effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial”). 
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1. State Sovereignty and Federalism as Evidence of Immunity 
This Article asserts that the state action doctrine is an immunity 
from suit for governmental defendants deemed part of the state and not 
merely a defense to liability. Concededly, the Supreme Court’s own 
characterization of the state action doctrine is not very helpful in deter-
mining whether the doctrine operates as an immunity or a defense.108 The 
Court has used a variety of terms to describe the state action doctrine. 
For example, the Court has alternated between calling the Parker protec-
tion an “immunity”109 and an “exemption.”110 Some commentators, how-
ever, have suggested that the terms “Parker immunity” and “state action 
immunity” are nothing more than misnomers.111 Indeed, Justice Brennan 
in his dissent in Mitchell v. Forsyth—a case approving the immediate 
appealability of an order denying qualified immunity to governmental 
officials—questioned the accuracy of the term “state action immuni-
ty.”112 
Despite these views, the constitutional principles underlying the 
state action doctrine demonstrate that the term “Parker immunity” is not 
a misnomer and accurately describes a right to be free from suit. In this 
regard, state sovereignty and federalism form a strong basis for the state 
action doctrine.113 The Court in Parker v. Brown explicated that “[i]n a 
                                                            
 108. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 2 n.7 (noting “the lack of a uniform 
characterization of the state action doctrine by the courts”). 
 109. See, e.g., FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1010 (2013) (using the 
term “state-action immunity”); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 
(1991) (using the term “Parker immunity” to refer to the state action doctrine); Cal. Retail Liquor 
Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (using the phrase “standards for 
antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown”); City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 
389, 412, 415 (1978) (also using “Parker immunity” to refer to the state action doctrine). 
 110. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 37 (1985) (using the term 
“state action exemption”); Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50 (1982) (using 
the term “Parker exemption”); see also Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 573 (1984) (using the 
phrase “exempt from Sherman Act liability”). 
 111. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate & Mark E. Bennett, Constitutional Limitations on Anticompeti-
tive State and Local Solid Waste Management Schemes: A New Frontier in Environmental Regula-
tion, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 174 (1997) (deeming the term “state action immunity” a “misno-
mer”); see also Duke & Co. Inc. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1279 n.5 (1975) (acknowledging the 
uncertainty in the proper characterization of the state action doctrine and that the issue “may be open 
to question”). 
 112. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 552–53 n.8 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating “numerous 
legal rights traditionally recognized as immunities include . . . the state-action immunity in antitrust 
law” but doubting “that the ordinary characterization of a wide variety of legal claims as ‘immuni-
ties’ establishes that trial court orders rejecting such claims are necessarily unreviewable at the ter-
mination of proceedings”). 
 113. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 370 (asserting the state action doctrine relies on “prin-
ciples of federalism and state sovereignty”); see STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 
1–2 (“At its heart, the state action doctrine respects the reserved authority of the several states to 
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dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states 
are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from 
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control over 
its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.”114 
Thus, the Court reasoned that, in light of states’ sovereign status and 
principles of federalism, Congress would not have intruded on states pre-
rogatives through the Sherman Act without expressly saying so.115 
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have recognized116 and ac-
cepted117 the constitutional principles of state sovereignty and federalism 
as a justification for the state action doctrine. Notably, in its most recent 
state action decision, North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC, the Supreme Court recognized that “the Sherman Act confers im-
munity on the States’ own anticompetitive policies out of respect for fed-
eralism.”118 Even the FTC has acknowledged that the state action doc-
trine is rooted in the constitutional notions of federalism and state sover-
eignty.119 The Court’s steadfast justification of the state action doctrine 
on federalism and state sovereignty grounds,120 therefore, proves that the 
doctrine is an immunity from suit. 
                                                                                                                                     
regulate economic activity within their respective borders as against the power of Congress to regu-
late interstate commerce.”). 
 114. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
 115. Id. The state action doctrine’s logic has even been invoked to restrict the FTC’s rulemak-
ing authority to abrogate state regulations. See Cal. State Bd. of Optometry v. FTC, 910 F.2d 976, 
978 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In that case, the D.C. Circuit struck down an FTC rule that created a defense to 
any state proceeding brought against an optometrist for violating certain state restrictions upon the 
practice of optometry. The court directly relied upon state action cases to conclude that a federal 
agency “may not exercise authority over States as sovereigns unless that authority has been unam-
biguously granted to it.” Id. at 982. 
 116. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 38 (1985) (“In Parker, rely-
ing on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, the Court refused to construe the Sherman Act 
as applying to the anticompetitive conduct of a State acting through its legislature”); FTC v. Ticor 
Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 633 (1992) (asserting “[o]ur decision [in Parker] was grounded in prin-
ciples of federalism”). 
 117. See, e.g., Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 372 (concluding that “in order to prevent 
Parker from undermining the very interests of federalism it is designed to protect, it is necessary to 
adopt a concept of authority broader than what is applied to determine the legality of the municipali-
ty’s action under state law”). 
 118. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015). 
 119. FTC OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 5 (2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf (recognizing that “[t]his refrain 
[respecting state sovereignty in our dual system of government] runs through Supreme Court juris-
prudence up through its most recent state action opinion”). 
 120. See supra notes 113–118 and accompanying text; see also Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, 
Efficiency, the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow a Consistent 
Free-Market Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1242 (1995) (opining that “the state-action antitrust ex-
emption has always been justified primarily on the grounds of federalism”); Jean Wegman Burns, 
Embracing Both Faces of Antitrust Federalism: Parker and ARC America Corp, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 
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Like its interpretation of the state action doctrine, the Court’s inter-
pretation of the Eleventh Amendment has also been guided by the con-
cepts of state sovereignty and the balance of power between the states 
and the federal government.121 For example, in Puerto Rico Aqueduct & 
Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., the Court held that a denial of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity was immediately appealable under the 
collateral order doctrine because of the importance of protecting a state’s 
dignitary interests.122 Because the Court’s interpretation of the scope of 
the state action doctrine and Eleventh Amendment rely on the common 
interests of federalism and state sovereignty, they should be analyzed 
similarly. Thus, like denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, denials of 
Parker immunity for governmental defendants should be immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. 
Additionally, in attempting to articulate a line between cases that 
involve collateral orders and those that do not, the Supreme Court has 
stated, “it is not mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that 
would imperil a substantial public interest, that counts when asking 
whether an order is ‘effectively’ unreviewable if review is to be left until 
later.”123 The Court explained that a party asserting that an order is effec-
tively unreviewable upon final judgment because of a right not to go to 
                                                                                                                                     
29, 29 (2000) (“Beginning with its 1943 decision in Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court has used 
federalism principles to define the scope of the federal antitrust laws and to protect state activity in 
the same area”) (footnote omitted). Interestingly, some scholars criticize the state action doctrine for 
failing to promote economic efficiency, which they posit, is a fundamental goal of federalism itself. 
See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfield, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action Doc-
trine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 1203, 1207 (1997) (contending that “[f]ederalism’s goal of economic efficiency . . . is not 
well protected by present state-action doctrine”); see also John Shepard Wiley Jr., Revision and 
Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1277, 1280 (1987) (arguing that the current state 
action doctrine is “irrational antitrust policy” and “offend[s] every antitrust goal”). 
 121. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002) (asserting that 
“[d]ual sovereignty is a defining feature of our Nation’s constitutional blueprint” and states “did not 
consent to become mere appendages of the Federal Government”) (internal citations omitted); Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 709 (1999) (“Federalism requires that Congress accord States the respect 
and dignity due them as residuary sovereigns and joint participants in the Nation’s governance.”); 
Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 172 (1977) 
(noting that “[c]onsiderations of federalism seem to underlie all aspects of the [E]leventh 
[A]mendment”). See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439, 457 (2002) (exploring the “role of sov-
ereign immunity in the Court’s federalism agenda” and noting that a “prominent line” of “federalism 
cases involves the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity”). 
 122. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993) (ruling 
that states “may take advantage of the collateral order doctrine to appeal a district court order deny-
ing a claim of Eleventh Amendment immunity”). 
 123. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 (2006) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
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trial must identify “some particular value of a high order . . . in avoiding 
trial.”124 The Court identified “respecting a State’s dignitary interests” as 
a “particular value of a high order.”125 Because the state action doctrine 
protects important dignitary and public interests, which would be lost if 
an antitrust suit against a state or an entity deemed part of the state is al-
lowed to proceed to trial,126 denial of an order to dismiss is effectively 
unreviewable after trial. 
State action immunity is analogous to Eleventh Amendment im-
munity because each is designed “to prevent the indignity of subjecting a 
State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals . . . and to ensure that 
the States’ dignitary interests can be fully vindicated.”127 In fact, antitrust 
lawsuits that are allowed to proceed against a state are more offensive to 
a state’s dignitary interests than other types of lawsuits because of the 
costliness of antitrust litigation.128 Forcing state governmental defendants 
to undergo a costly trial process is unfair and incompatible with the spirit 
of the Eleventh Amendment and Parker immunity. Just as orders deny-
ing Eleventh Amendment immunity are immediately appealable under 
the collateral order doctrine,129 so too should rulings denying Parker 
immunity be immediately appealable under the doctrine. 
2. Challenges to Characterizing the State Action Doctrine as Something 
Other Than an Immunity 
Despite the similarities between the Eleventh Amendment and the 
state action doctrine, some circuits have found rulings denying state ac-
tion immunity not immediately appealable under the collateral order doc-
trine. These courts maintain that the Court in Parker v. Brown was simp-
ly construing the Sherman Act, rather than “identify[ing] or articulat[ing] 
a constitutional or common law ‘right not to be tried,’”130 and point to the 
following passage from Parker for support: 
                                                            
 124. Id. at 352. 
 125. Id. (citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146). 
 126. However, the state action doctrine does not protect these same important interests if suit 
against a municipality or other governmental entity not deemed part of the state is allowed to pro-
ceed to trial. See infra Part IV.A. 
 127. Martin v. Mem’l Hosp., 86 F.3d 1391, 1395–96 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing P.R. Aqueduct & 
Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 146). 
 128. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that “proceeding to 
antitrust discovery can be expensive”); see also William Kolasky, Antitrust Litigation: What’s 
Changed in Twenty-Five Years?, 27 ANTITRUST 9, 15 (2012) (explaining that “e-discovery has been 
one of the main reasons antitrust litigation has become increasingly expensive, both for plaintiffs and 
defendants”). 
 129. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 506 U.S. at 147. 
 130. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2006). 
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We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history 
which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers 
or agents from activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system 
of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sov-
ereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from 
their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state’s control 
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Con-
gress.131 
However, such reasoning seems unsound and tends to ignore the similar 
justification of protecting the state’s dignitary interests underlying the 
Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment and the state action 
doctrine. Alternatively, it appears as if the Court was creating a common 
law right not to be tried. 
Some scholars observe that the Court in Parker went out of its way 
to create the state action doctrine and that the Court “displayed extraor-
dinary confidence and willingness to make law in Parker.”132 One possi-
ble explanation as to why the Court went out of its way to create the state 
action doctrine is that the Court recognized the importance of state sov-
ereignty as well as federalism and felt the need to articulate these princi-
ples in the context of antitrust law. Consequently, the argument that the 
state action doctrine is not an immunity because the Court in Parker did 
not expressly articulate “a constitutional or common law right not to be 
tried” conveniently overlooks the important, parallel rationales underly-
ing both the state action doctrine and Eleventh Amendment immunity.133 
Despite what some commentators have asserted,134 the term “im-
munity” is not a misnomer when the state action doctrine protects gov-
ernmental defendants that are deemed part of the state itself. In fact, the 
term “exemption” is rather inappropriate135 and “[r]eference to the Par-
ker doctrine as the ‘state-action exemption’ is a confusing misuse of the 
                                                            
 131. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943); see Acoustic Sys. Inc. v. Wenger Corp., 
207 F.3d 287, 292 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000) (claiming the term “state action immunity” is “actually a mis-
nomer because the doctrine is but a recognition of the limited reach of the Sherman Act”); see also 
Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 171 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(stating “[w]hile thus a convenient shorthand, ‘Parker immunity’ is more accurately a strict standard 
for locating the reach of the Sherman Act”). 
 132. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 713, 715–17 (1986). 
 133. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 134. See supra notes 110–112 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Note, Cheaters, Not Criminals: Antitrust Invalidation of Statutes 
Outlawing Sports Agent Recruitment of Student Athletes, 105 YALE L.J. 1603, 1622 (1996). 
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term ‘exemption.’”136 The Court in Parker concluded that Congress did 
not intend to apply antitrust laws to conduct sanctioned by state govern-
ments.137 Characterizing the state action doctrine as an “exemption” is, 
therefore, inaccurate because conduct that does not violate an act hardly 
needs to be exempted from its operation.138 
 One influential antitrust treatise has asserted that the “Parker 
doctrine is designed to be an immunity, not merely a defense that can be 
offered at trial.”139 This statement makes sense in light of the fact that the 
state action doctrine—like the Eleventh Amendment140—has consistently 
been viewed through the lens of federalism and state sovereignty by the 
Supreme Court.141 Therefore, like the Eleventh Amendment, the state 
action doctrine should be considered an immunity in the context of litiga-
tion involving state governmental defendants. The unreviewability prong 
of the collateral order doctrine is frequently found to be met in cases 
where an immunity is asserted because “‘the bell could not be un-rung’ if 
the parties had to wait for an appeal from a final judgment.”142 Because 
the state action doctrine is in fact an immunity from suit and not merely a 
defense to liability, Parker immunity satisfies the unreviewability prong 
of the collateral order doctrine. 
B. Separability 
Parker immunity similarly satisfies the separability prong of the 
collateral order doctrine, which requires that a ruling resolve an im-
portant issue completely separate from the merits of the action.143 This is 
                                                            
 136. Kenneth J. King, Note, The Preemption Alternative to Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 145, 145 n.5 (1982). 
 137. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
 138. Paul E. Slater, Antitrust and Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. 
Brown, 69 NW. U. L. REV. 71, 72 n.4 (1974). 
 139. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, 
§ 2.04b, at 2-50 (4th ed. 2011). But see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 2, at 1272 
(characterizing the state action doctrine as an “affirmative defense”). 
 140. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 756 (2002) (quoting P.R. 
Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)) (stating the “central 
purpose” of the sovereign immunity doctrine “is to ‘accord the States the respect owed them as’ joint 
sovereigns”); see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (noting state sovereign immunity is a 
fundamental principle of “Our Federalism”); John Evans Taylor, Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REV. 513, 520–21 (1983) (stating that common law sovereign 
immunity principles have informed the Eleventh Amendment doctrine and that “courts treat the 
[E]leventh [A]mendment as a tool of federalism”). 
 141. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 4, at 277 (“Oddly, the Court has never explained why 
federalism dictates the specific form of the [state action] doctrine that has taken shape over the 
years.”). 
 142. CASTANIAS & KLONOFF, supra note 65, at 85. 
 143. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006). 
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the requirement that an order address a “collateral” issue.144 The “text-
book case” of a collateral issue is a defense of immunity from suit.145 For 
example, determinations of Parker immunity involving governmental 
defendants deemed part of the state require an inquiry completely sepa-
rate from the merits of the underlying issue of whether an antitrust viola-
tion occurred.146 State action determinations for government entities that 
are deemed part of the state only involve a discrete issue of law:  Wheth-
er the action is that of a state acting as a sovereign?147 Thus, a determina-
tion of Parker immunity for governmental defendants deemed part of the 
state can be resolved without an elaborate inquiry into the merits of the 
underlying antitrust action.148 Even courts that have found a denial of 
Parker immunity not immediately appealable recognize that state action 
doctrine analysis is separable from the merits of an antitrust action when 
the defendant is a government entity that is part of the state.149 
In addition, the Supreme Court has gone out if its way to find that 
different types of immunity satisfy the collateral order doctrine’s “com-
pletely separate from the merits” condition. For example, in Mitchell v. 
Forsyth, the Court plainly altered the “completely separate from the mer-
its” prong to find qualified immunity immediately appealable.150 The 
Court asserted that the second prong of the collateral order doctrine was 
satisfied because the issue of immunity was “conceptually distinct” from 
the merits.151 This “significant and unclarified dilution of the separability 
                                                            
 144. CASTANIAS & KLONOFF, supra note 65, at 84. 
 145. Id.; see Petty, supra note 65, at 399 (averring “that a right not to stand trial passes th[e] 
test” of being an issue completely separate from the merits). 
 146. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 228a, at 227 (stating “[i]t bears emphasis 
that the absence of an immunity does not indicate the presence of an antitrust offense”). 
 147. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 570, 574 (1984) (stating “[w]hen the conduct is that 
of the sovereign itself . . . the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise” and “[t]he 
only requirement is that the action be that of the State acting as a sovereign”). 
 148. This is not to say that the question of whether a governmental entity qualifies as part of 
the state acting as a sovereign does not involve a complex, fact-laden inquiry. See supra note 91. 
Indeed, a recurring issue raised by the state action doctrine is whether a state regulatory board must 
meet either or both of the Midcal prongs. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 112; 
see N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110 (2015). Thus, an inquiry into 
the structure of a state regulatory board to determine whether it is a private actor or a governmental 
entity that is part of the state may sometimes be difficult. However, such a question does not involve 
an in-depth examination of the merits of the substantive antitrust violation; it is strictly an inquiry 
into the identity of the defendant. 
 149. See, e.g., S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 442–43 (4th Cir. 2006) (stat-
ing “[t]o be sure, the Parker analysis does not always require an inquiry into whether the state acted 
to displace competition; the ipso facto exemption [immunity for government entities part of the 
state] turns only on the identity of the defendant”). 
 150. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 527 (1985). 
 151. Id. 
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requirement” illustrates the Court’s resounding commitment to the im-
mediate appealablity of denials of immunity.152 Because the state action 
doctrine is an immunity for governmental defendants deemed part of the 
state itself,153 there is a strong possibility that the Supreme Court could 
find that a trial court’s denial of Parker immunity satisfies the collateral 
order doctrine’s separability prong. 
C. Conclusiveness 
The conclusiveness prong of the collateral order doctrine requires 
that a ruling “conclusively determine the disputed question.”154 This is 
the most straightforward prong of the collateral order doctrine155 and the 
condition that is easiest to satisfy.156 It is simply an inquiry into whether 
the district court’s order finally and conclusively determines the disputed 
question.157 A court’s denial of a governmental defendant’s motion to 
dismiss an antitrust claim under the state action doctrine conclusively 
disposes of the question of whether the governmental entity may be sub-
ject to suit. One court that has held denials of Parker immunity not im-
mediately appealable has even acknowledged that “[t]here is no dispute 
that the denial of Parker protection satisfies the first collateral order re-
quirement.”158 
For a question to be “conclusively determined,” it must not be a 
tentative ruling that is likely to be subject to later reconsideration.159 Un-
like an evidentiary ruling on a motion in limine, a ruling on the state ac-
tion doctrine is not a tentative or informal order. An adverse ruling 
against a defendant on the state action doctrine is unlikely to be revised 
before the entry of judgment on the underlying question of whether an 
                                                            
 152. Glynn, supra note 87, at 207; see Steinman, supra note 87, at 1254 (criticizing the Court’s 
treatment of the “separate from the merits” requirement in immunity cases). 
 153. See supra Part III.A. 
 154. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993). 
 155. Petty, supra note 65, at 398. 
 156. Steinman, supra note 87, at 1254–55 (maintaining that the conclusiveness prong is “easily 
met in connection with almost all interlocutory orders,” that the collateral order doctrine embodies a 
“relaxed definition of finality,” and that the other two elements of the doctrine do most of the “leg-
work” in preventing orders from being immediately appealable); see Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1983) (holding that a district court’s stay order was ap-
pealable as a final decision because the requirement that a matter be conclusively determined should 
be evaluated from a practical, not rigid, standpoint). 
 157. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 158. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 441 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 159. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468–69 n.11 (finding that before the addition of Rule 
23(f) to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which now permits interlocutory review of class certi-
fication rulings, denials of class certification were “inherently tentative” and thus not conclusive 
determinations of the disputed issue). 
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antitrust violation actually occurred.160 Consequently, any denial of Par-
ker immunity, regardless of whether the defendant is a governmental en-
tity or private party, satisfies the conclusiveness prong of the collateral 
order doctrine. 
D. Preserving Judicial Economy 
One of the most important rationales behind the final judgment rule 
limiting immediate appeals is a desire to achieve judicial economy and 
efficiency. The Supreme Court has maintained that permitting piecemeal, 
prejudgment appeals “undermines ‘efficient judicial administration.’”161 
Hence, the Court has cautioned that “the class of collaterally appealable 
orders must remain ‘narrow and selective in its membership.’”162 How-
ever, orders denying state action immunity to governmental defendants 
deemed part of the state warrant membership within this “narrow and 
selective” class of orders that are immediately appealable. 
Allowing the immediate appeal of orders denying Parker immunity 
to governmental entities deemed part of the state will not undermine “ef-
ficient judicial administration”163 and judicial economy because very few 
antitrust cases involving the state action doctrine will be immediately 
appealable under the collateral order doctrine. There are few instances in 
which the state action doctrine is litigated that will have an actual state as 
the defendant—the doctrine is mostly invoked by private parties, munic-
ipalities, and quasi-governmental entities such as state regulatory 
boards.164 Because orders denying Parker immunity should not be im-
mediately appealable by those defendants needing to satisfy either or 
both Midcal prongs (i.e., municipalities, state regulatory boards, private 
parties, etc.),165 only a small subset of cases will be immediately appeal-
                                                            
 160. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 281 (1986) (upholding municipal rent con-
trol scheme without addressing the applicability of the state action doctrine because there was no 
violation of the substantive antitrust laws). 
 161. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (quoting Firestone Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981). 
 162. Id. at 113 (quoting Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006)). 
 163. Id. at 106. 
 164. See STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 110 (noting that only a “relative-
ly small group of cases involve the direct actions of a sovereign state authority”); Susan Beth 
Farmer, Balancing State Sovereignty and Competition: An Analysis of the Impact of Seminole Tribe 
on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, 42 VILL. L. REV. 111, 183, 185 (1997) (claiming 
the Court’s decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), “essentially elimi-
nates the need for state action immunity with respect to suits against states” and that “the relevance 
and need for the state action doctrine is now basically limited to private actors”). 
 165. See infra Part IV.A (discussing municipalities and state regulatory boards); infra Part 
IV.B (discussing private parties). 
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able under the collateral order doctrine. Thus, this Article’s conclusion 
that governmental entities deemed part of the state are allowed to appeal 
adverse rulings on Parker immunity does not thrust open the floodgates 
to scores of appeals and will not undermine judicial economy. 
Even if many state action cases include a governmental defendant 
that can immediately appeal an adverse ruling under the collateral order 
doctrine, there still would be no disruption of “efficient judicial admin-
istration.” Governmental defendants “typically fare well on motions to 
dismiss based on the state action doctrine” and only in “rare circum-
stances” will courts deny a governmental defendant’s motion to dismiss 
after invoking Parker immunity.166 Consequently, allowing the immedi-
ate appeal of orders denying Parker immunity to governmental entities 
will not undermine judicial economy because very few antitrust cases 
will be subject to the collateral order doctrine at the outset of litigation. 
IV. DEFENDANTS NEEDING TO SATISFY ONE OR BOTH OF THE MIDCAL 
PRONGS 
Even if defendants are not governmental entities deemed part of the 
state, they may still be able to successfully assert a claim of Parker im-
munity if they can satisfy one or both of the Midcal prongs.167 However, 
this Part asserts that defendants needing to satisfy Midcal’s clear articula-
tion or active supervision prongs should not be able to immediately ap-
peal an adverse state action determination under the collateral order doc-
trine. 
A. Governmental Entities Not Deemed Part of the State 
Local governmental entities, such as counties and municipalities, 
may seek protection under the state action doctrine when they act 
anticompetitively.168 State regulatory boards, agencies, authorities, and 
commissions are also entities that sometimes attempt to avail themselves 
of Parker immunity when they act anticompetitively.169 These govern-
                                                            
 166. STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 135, 138; see PHILIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW § 2.04b, at 2-49 (4th ed. 2011) (claim-
ing “many” state action determinations “can be resolved at the summary judgment stage or earlier”). 
 167. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1980); 
see supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
 168. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985). 
 169. See, e.g., Rectrix Aerodrome Ctrs., Inc. v. Barnstable Mun. Airport Comm’n, 610 F.3d 8, 
9 (1st Cir. 2010) (airport authority seeking Parker protection); S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 
455 F.3d 436, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006) (state regulatory board); Askew v. DCH Reg’l Health Care 
Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1034 (11th Cir. 1993) (public health care authority); Porter Testing Lab. v. 
Bd. of Regents, 993 F.2d 768, 769 (10th Cir. 1993) (board overseeing state colleges). 
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mental entities must satisfy the clear articulation prong of the Midcal test 
because they are not entities deemed part of the state itself.170 Orders 
denying Parker immunity to governmental defendants who must satisfy 
Midcal’s clear articulation prong should not be immediately appealable 
because such orders fail to satisfy the second and third conditions of the 
collateral order doctrine. 
1. Unreviewability 
Actions against governmental entities that must satisfy the clear ar-
ticulation requirement are not effectively unreviewable upon final judg-
ment because the state action doctrine functions as a defense rather than 
an immunity for these types of entities. The Eleventh Amendment once 
again provides guidance on whether the state action doctrine is an im-
munity from suit or a defense to liability. The Supreme Court has ruled 
that municipalities and other local government entities are not treated as 
sovereign and do not receive immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment.171 Correspondingly, the Court has asserted that local government 
entities are ineligible for “sovereign” treatment under the state action 
doctrine. The Court stated, “[c]ities are not themselves sovereign; they 
do not receive all the federal deference of the States that create them.”172 
Therefore, when used in the context of subordinate government entities, 
“Parker immunity” is a misnomer. 
Furthermore, orders denying state action protection to governmen-
tal entities that must satisfy Midcal’s clear articulation prong are not ef-
fectively unreviewable upon final judgment because those entities cannot 
                                                            
 170. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40; Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569–574 (1984); see 
S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 63 (1985) (stating “Parker 
immunity is available only when the challenged activity is undertaken pursuant to a clearly articulat-
ed policy of the State itself, such as a policy approved by a state legislature or a State Supreme 
Court”). It should be noted that some regulatory boards and commissions will be deemed private 
actors. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (concluding that 
state dentistry board must satisfy both Midcal prongs because board was controlled by active market 
participants and was akin to a private trade association vested with regulatory authority). Thus, in 
addition to the difficult task of distinguishing an agency part of the “state itself” from a subordinate 
government agency, see supra note 91, courts may also have to address the “vexatious question” of 
whether an agency is a public or private actor. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 227a, at 215 
(emphasizing that “establishing immunity in a particular case requires a determination of whether 
the relevant actor is properly classified as the “state itself” [neither clear articulation nor active su-
pervision required], a subordinate agency or subdivision [clear articulation required but not active 
supervision], or merely a private actor [requiring both clear articulation and active supervision]”). 
 171. See Lincoln Cnty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 533 (1890) (holding the Eleventh Amendment 
does not bar an individual’s suit in federal court against a county for nonpayment of a debt). 
 172. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 (1978). 
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identify a “particular value of a high order . . . in avoiding trial.”173 Local 
government entities are not entitled to the same protection as a state it-
self, and the same concern about protecting a sovereign’s dignitary inter-
ests is not present. Accordingly, the state action doctrine does not operate 
as an immunity for local governmental entities and thus fails to meet the 
unreviewability prong of the collateral order doctrine. 
Similar to the treatment of local governmental entities, the state ac-
tion doctrine does not operate as an immunity for those state regulatory 
boards and agencies that are not granted independent sovereign status. 
The Eleventh Amendment provides immunity only to a governmental 
entity deemed an “arm of the state.”174 Likewise, courts considering the 
applicability of the state action doctrine must also make a determination 
of whether a governmental entity is part of the state itself and eligible for 
sovereign treatment since an entity deemed part of the state need not 
meet the Midcal test.175 Just as a determination must be made regarding 
whether an entity qualifies as sovereign in the Eleventh Amendment con-
text in order to ascertain whether an entity qualifies for immunity, a simi-
lar determination of whether an entity qualifies as part of the state is 
made in the antitrust state action framework. Because the state action 
doctrine does not operate as an immunity for governmental entities that 
are not part of the state, the unreviewability prong of the collateral order 
doctrine is not satisfied. Drawing the line between the state itself and 
subordinate governmental entities that are not part of the state in deter-
mining whether state action protection is an immunity may seem artifi-
cial; however, this distinction makes sense when analogized to how enti-
ties are granted Eleventh Amendment protection.176 
                                                            
 173. Compare Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352 (2006) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)), with supra text accompanying notes 123–126. 
 174. N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (asserting that “only 
States and arms of the State possess immunity from suits authorized by federal law”). It is important 
to note that the courts appear to employ different tests to determine whether a particular governmen-
tal entity is an “arm of the state” and thus able to benefit from the state’s Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit. See also Héctor G. Bladuell, Note, Twins or Triplets?: Protecting the Eleventh 
Amendment Through a Three-Prong Arm-of-the-State Test, 105 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2007) (survey-
ing case law and proposing a unified arm-of-the-state test). 
 175. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 176. Indeed, “fiction and illogic” pervade Eleventh Amendment immunity. Camille Gearhart, 
Note, Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment: Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. 
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984), 60 WASH. L. REV. 407, 407 (1985); see Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (describing the principle of Ex Parte Young as “rest[ing] on a fic-
tional distinction”). Thus, there is no reason why an artificial distinction cannot exist in determining 
when the antitrust state action doctrine acts as an immunity. 
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2. Separability 
Actions against governmental entities that must satisfy Midcal’s 
first prong—the clear articulation requirement—also do not satisfy the 
collateral order doctrine’s separability condition. The analysis necessary 
to determine whether a governmental entity satisfies the “clear articula-
tion” prong of the Midcal test is sometimes significantly enmeshed with 
the ultimate merits determination of whether anticompetitive conduct 
occurred. Governmental entities that must meet the clear articulation re-
quirement must answer more than the relatively simple question of 
whether the action is that of a state acting as a sovereign.177 Specifically, 
determining whether a governmental entity satisfies the clear articulation 
requirement involves an inquiry not separable from the merits of the anti-
trust action.178 In determining whether the clear articulation requirement 
is met, a court must examine state law and establish that the state has a 
clearly articulated policy to displace competition. This inquiry is inher-
ently intertwined with the underlying cause of action, which requires a 
determination of whether anticompetitive conduct occurred. As a result, 
actions against governmental entities that must satisfy Midcal’s clear 
articulation prong are not completely separate from the merits of the un-
derlying antitrust action. 
B. Private Parties 
The division among federal appellate courts179 over the immediate 
appealability of orders denying a motion to dismiss an antitrust claim 
under the state action doctrine is not as broad when private entities are 
the defendants.180 Private parties cannot satisfy the unreviewability prong 
of the collateral order doctrine because the state action doctrine does not 
operate as an immunity when the defendant is not a governmental entity 
that is part of the state.181 Moreover, the same concerns about respecting 
a state’s dignitary interests are not present when the defendant is a pri-
vate entity. Because private parties are not governmental entities deemed 
                                                            
 177. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569, 574 (1984) (stating “[w]hen the conduct is that 
of the sovereign itself . . . the danger of unauthorized restraint of trade does not arise” and “[t]he 
only requirement is that the action be that of ‘the State acting as a sovereign’”). 
 178. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 442–43 (4th Cir. 2006) 
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 15–21. 
 180. See Auraria Student Hous. at the Regency, LLC v. Campus Vill. Apartments, LLC, 703 
F.3d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the circuit split on the question of whether denial 
of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by private parties “is much less pronounced” than the 
circuit split on the question of whether denial of Parker immunity is immediately appealable by 
governmental defendants). 
 181. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
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part of the state and must satisfy both prongs of Midcal,182 there is no 
fear of impinging on a state’s dignitary interests. With the exception of 
rulings adverse to criminal defendants on double jeopardy issues,183 the 
Court has only found orders denying immunity to governmental defend-
ants to be immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.184 
According to the Court, orders denying defenses may be effectively 
reviewed on appeal from a final judgment because, even after a trial on 
the merits, the appellate court can reverse the earlier denial and order the 
case dismissed.185 Private parties, therefore, cannot satisfy the 
unreveiwability prong of the collateral order doctrine because the state 
action doctrine does not operate as an immunity when the defendant is 
not a governmental entity. In addition, private parties must satisfy both 
prongs of Midcal, which makes the state action determination not com-
pletely separate from the antitrust merits.186 
V. PARKER IMMUNITY AND THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE IN 
APPEALS FROM FTC ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
Adjudicative procedures for FTC administrative litigation are gov-
erned by the Federal Trade Commission Act187 and by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.188 Analogous to the final judgment rule for appellate re-
view of district court decisions, only “final” agency actions are subject to 
judicial review.189 In other words, nonfinal agency action is generally 
unreviewable by federal courts. However, the federal courts of appeals 
have held that nonfinal agency action that meets the requirements of the 
collateral order doctrine is subject to judicial review.190 As the “nation’s 
                                                            
 182. See supra Part I. 
 183. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977). 
 184. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 237–40 (2007); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf 
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144–45 (1993); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982). 
 185. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 187. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-9). 
 188. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (West, Westlaw through P.L 114-9). 
 189. Id. § 704 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-9) (“Agency action made reviewable by stat-
ute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to 
judicial review. A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling not directly re-
viewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action.”). See generally FTC v. 
Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 239–40 (1980) (examining when FTC action is final under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act). 
 190. Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2004) (asserting that “every circuit to have 
considered the question to date has determined (often with little or no analysis) that the collateral 
order doctrine applies to judicial review of administrative determinations”); Chehazeh v. Attorney 
Gen. of U.S., 666 F.3d 118, 136 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that “the nine Courts of Appeals that have 
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premier circuit court for administrative law review”191 put it, the collat-
eral order doctrine “extends beyond the confines of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to 
encompass the principle of administrative finality.”192 Although it has not 
squarely addressed the issue, the Supreme Court has suggested that the 
collateral order doctrine applies to judicial review of agency action.193 
Thus, parties to an administrative adjudication may also invoke the col-
lateral order doctrine when they seek to gain immediate review of agency 
decisions in Article III courts. 
The FTC’s internal procedures, which govern the way the agency 
operates, also do not serve as a barrier to review of nonfinal agency ac-
tion under the collateral order doctrine. The FTC Rules of Practice state 
that adjudicative proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously.194 On the 
one hand, this may seem to counsel in favor of prohibiting a procedural 
game of ping-pong every time a governmental agency deemed part of the 
state seeks to appeal the Commission’s denial of state action immunity to 
the relevant federal circuit court of appeals. On the other hand, the FTC’s 
policy explicitly notes that proceedings shall be conducted expeditiously 
“to the extent practicable and consistent with requirements of law.”195 
Case law suggests that the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial 
review of agency decisions.196 As a result, the FTC Rules of Practice do 
not pose an obstacle to judicial review of nonfinal agency action. 
Because agency action can be subject to judicial review under the 
collateral order doctrine, the sole issue presented by immediate appeals 
from agency denials of state action immunity is whether such appeals fall 
within the collateral order doctrine. This Article’s analysis of the imme-
diate appealability of orders denying state action immunity in Article III 
                                                                                                                                     
addressed [whether the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial review of agency decisions] have 
all concluded that it does”); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 43 F.3d 912, 916 
(4th Cir. 1995) (“It is well-settled that [the Cohen] requirements of the collateral order doctrine 
apply not only to judicial decisions, but also to appeals from executive agency action.”). 
 191. Timothy H. Gray, Note, Manual Override? Accardi, Skidmore, and the Legal Effect of the 
Social Security Administration’s HALLEX Manual, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 962–63 (2014). 
 192. Meredith v. Fed. Mine Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 177 F.3d 1042, 1051 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (permitting judicial review of administrative decision that had denied immunity from suit 
claimed by employees of the Mine Safety and Health Administration). 
 193. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1980) (applying collateral order 
doctrine’s elements to a nonfinal FTC decision). The Supreme Court has further concluded that, “at 
least in the absence of an appealable collateral order, the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction 
only over a final order of the Department [of Education].” Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778 
(1983) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 194. 16 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2015). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra notes 189–192 and accompanying text. 
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courts197 is, therefore, equally applicable when parties appeal from an 
FTC proceeding. Thus, governmental defendants deemed part of the state 
should have the right of an immediate appeal from an FTC decision 
denying state action immunity. In contrast, governmental defendants not 
deemed part of the state and private parties should not be able to gain 
immediate review under the collateral order doctrine of an FTC decision 
denying state action immunity.   
The state action doctrine is frequently raised in FTC adjudicative 
proceedings.198 One notable case stemming from an FTC adjudication is 
South Carolina State Board of Dentistry v. FTC.199 In that case, the FTC 
alleged in an administrative complaint that the South Carolina State 
Board of Dentistry restrained competition in violation of Section 5 of the 
FTC Act.200 The State Board of Dentistry then moved to dismiss the 
complaint on state action grounds;201 however, the Commission denied 
the State Board of Dentistry’s motion to dismiss.202 The Commission’s 
decision was not a final order because the matter had not yet proceeded 
to an administrative trial on the merits (often referred to as an evidentiary 
hearing) before an administrative law judge.203 The State Board of Den-
tistry immediately challenged the Commission’s order denying its mo-
tion to dismiss on state action grounds by seeking judicial review in the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.204 The Fourth Circuit ruled 
that orders denying Parker immunity were not immediately appealable 
because such orders fail to satisfy the unreviewability and separability 
prongs of the collateral order doctrine.205 
                                                            
 197. See supra Parts III–IV. 
 198. E.g., Ky. Household Goods Carriers Ass’n, Inc., 139 F.T.C. 404, 405 (2005); N.H. Motor 
Transp. Ass’n, 136 F.T.C. 869, 884 (2003); Ala. Trucking Ass’n, 136 F.T.C. 886, 903 (2003); Minn. 
Transp. Servs. Ass’n, 136 F.T.C. 719, 734 (2003). 
 199. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 438, 438–39 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 200. See Complaint, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229 (Sept. 15, 2003) (No. 
9311). 
 201. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 
F.T.C. 229 (Oct. 21, 2003) (No. 9311). 
 202. In re S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 138 F.T.C. 229, 266 (2004). The State Board of Dentis-
try also moved to dismiss the complaint on mootness grounds, but the Commission determined that 
it could not resolve the mootness issue without additional discovery and referred the case to an FTC 
administrative law judge for limited discovery on that issue. Id. 
 203. Pursuant to the FTC Rules of Practice, motions to dismiss filed before an evidentiary 
hearing are referred directly to the Commission and are ruled on by the Commission unless the 
Commission in its discretion refers the motion to the administrative law judge. 16 C.F.R. 
§ 3.24(a)(1)–(2) (2015). 
 204. Brief for Petitioner at 1–2, S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436 (4th Cir. 
2006) (No. 04-2006), 2005 WL 3775766, at *1. 
 205. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 441. Interestingly, the court did not address the 
threshold question of whether the collateral order doctrine even applies to judicial review of agency 
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The state action doctrine was also raised by a different state dental 
board in a case originating from an unrelated FTC adjudicative proceed-
ing. In North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC,206 the 
FTC had issued an administrative complaint claiming the Board of Den-
tal Examiners violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. Subsequently, the 
Board of Dental Examiners moved to dismiss the administrative com-
plaint before an evidentiary hearing had taken place on the ground that 
its conduct was exempted by the state action doctrine.207 However, the 
Commission denied the Board of Dental Examiners’ motion to dismiss. 
In contrast to the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry, the North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners did not immediately seek ju-
dicial review of the Commission’s order denying its motion to dismiss on 
state action grounds.208 Instead, the North Carolina State Board of Dental 
Examiners waited until after the Commission affirmed the administrative 
law judge’s finding that the Board violated the FTC Act to appeal the 
denial of state action immunity to the Fourth Circuit.209 The North Caro-
lina State Board of Dental Examiners likely did not immediately appeal 
the Commission’s denial of state action immunity on tactical grounds 
because the Fourth Circuit had already held in South Carolina State 
Board of Dentistry that denials of Parker immunity were not immediate-
ly appealable. Although the Fourth Circuit has found an FTC denial of 
state action immunity to not be immediately appealable as a collateral 
order,210 it will be interesting to see how a circuit that has not encoun-
tered this issue will rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The state action doctrine is an important area of antitrust law. Not 
only is the doctrine conceptually interesting because it implicates feder-
alism and state sovereignty issues, but it also has great practical impact. 
A fairly significant number of antitrust disputes involve Parker immuni-
                                                                                                                                     
action. However, a concurring opinion noted that it was assumed that the collateral order analysis 
applied to the FTC’s decision. Id. at 448 (Traxler, J., concurring) (citing FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 
449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980)). 
 206. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 207. See In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 609 (2011). 
 208. Id.; Brief for Petitioner at 1–3, 24–25, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. 
Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 209. In re N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 151 F.T.C. 607 (2011); Brief for Petitioner at 1–3, 
24–25, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015). 
 210. S.C. State Bd. of Dentistry, 455 F.3d at 439. 
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ty questions.211 One of the areas of confusion over the scope of the state 
action doctrine is whether an order denying a motion to dismiss an anti-
trust claim under the state action doctrine is immediately appealable as a 
collateral order. The profound circuit split on this complex question 
demonstrates the significance of this issue in antitrust appellate practice. 
Because the state action doctrine’s parentage derives from the same 
principles of federalism and state sovereignty as the Eleventh Amend-
ment,212 the best understanding of the doctrine is as an immunity when 
applied to governmental defendants that are considered part the of the 
state itself. On the other hand, the state action doctrine does not function 
as an immunity when defendants must satisfy the Midcal framework 
(i.e., government entities that are not considered part of the state and pri-
vate parties). Finally, allowing the immediate appeal of orders denying 
Parker immunity to governmental entities that are part of the state will 
not undermine the final judgment rule’s goal of ensuring efficient judi-
cial administration. 
The state action doctrine is essentially “an attempt to resolve the 
tension between federalism concepts favoring states’ rights and national 
policies favoring competition.”213 This Article’s conclusion—that some 
governmental defendants should have the right of an immediate appeal 
while denying an immediate appeal to other governmental defendants 




 211. See STATE ACTION PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 7, at 83 (asserting that the state action 
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and energy and utilities). 
 212. See supra Part III.A.1. 
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